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Harris v. Quinn:
What We Talk About When We Talk
About Right-to-Work Laws
Michael J. Yelnosky*
Who could oppose a right to work? What could anyone find
objectionable in the recent declaration by the State of Michigan
that it, like twenty-three others, is a right-to-work state?l
It turns out that it depends on what the meaning of a "right to
work" is. If a right to work means, as it would in common usage, a
right to get and keep a job assuming satisfactory qualifications
and performance, opponents abound. They include academics
espousing the benefits of unregulated markets2 and the United
States Chamber of Commerce, which argues that restrictions on
an employer's freedom to discharge employees at-will hinders job
growth. 3 And the opponents of this right to work have prevailed.
* Dean and Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law. Thanks to
Amanda Garganese for her research assistance.
1. See Elizabeth Hartfield, Michigan Governor Signs Right to Work Bill
Into Law, ABC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Pohtics/
michigan-governor-signs-work-bill-law/story?id= 17934332.
2. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
3. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE IMPACT OF STATE EMPLOYMENT
PRACTICES ON JOB GROWTH: A 50-STATE REVIEW 13-15 (2011), available at
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/201103WFI Sta
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In every state, with the exception of Montana, 4 employers are
generally free "to discharge or retain employees at will for good
cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause."5 This rule of at-will
employment is the bedrock principle of American employment law.
In American labor law, by contrast, "right to work" has a very
different meaning. It has, and this is not hyperbole, "nothing
whatsoever to do with granting anyone a right to get work or
protecting those who have a job from losing it."6 Instead, right-to-
work laws permit employees in the private sector who are covered
by a collective bargaining agreement that is negotiated and
administered by a union to refuse to pay for the union's services. 7
Under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), in states
without right-to-work laws, non-members covered by a collective
bargaining agreement can be required under that agreement to
pay their fair share for those services. 8 The Supreme Court has
determined that this NLRA provision permits objectors to refuse
to pay for union "political activity," an interpretation, the Court
has continued to explain, that avoids a difficult First Amendment
question. 9  Labor lawyers refer to provisions in collective
bargaining agreements that require lawful payments by non-
members as "union-security clauses." 10
The proponents of union-security clauses explain that without
them,
individual workers can easily become "free riders," taking
the benefits of collective representation without paying
their fair share of the costs. Not only dissenters but any
teBook.pdf.
4. See Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2013) (making it unlawful for an employer to discharge
an employee without good cause).
5. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884), overruled in
part by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
6. Rick Ungar, Op-ed, 'Right-to-Work' Laws Explained, Debunked And
Demystified, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2012, 2:37 P.M.), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
rickungar/2012/12/1 /right-to-work-laws -explained-debunked-demystified/.
7. See 29U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
8. Id. § 158(a)(3).
9. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762-63 (1988).
10. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Op-ed, Right to Work' is a Misnomer,
NATL L.J. & LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 7, 2013, at 31, 31; Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions,
Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 800, 813 (2012).
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employee who wants to save a buck can "free ride." The
net result may be that the union cannot afford to
represent workers effectively, and everyone suffers. 11
To put a finer point on it, a union has a duty to represent all
members of the bargaining unit fairly, without making
distinctions between members and non-members. 12 Thus, in a
right-to-work state an employee could take any pay raise
negotiated on her behalf by the union but refuse to pay any of the
costs associated with the union's negotiating operation.
Right-to-work proponents make several arguments against
enforcement of union-security clauses. Some are based on notions
of individual liberty and freedom from coercion. As the National
Right to Work Committee puts it, no "American[ ] ... should ever
be forced to affiliate with a union in order to get or keep a job." 13
There are economic arguments as well. The standard economic
case for right-to-work laws goes something like this: unionization
is harmful because it artificially increases the wages of union
labor and decreases the wages of non-union workers. Right-to-
work laws make it harder for unions to organize workers.
Therefore, right-to-work laws are good for the economy. Moreover,
if firms choose to locate in areas where the risk of unionization is
lower, right-to-work laws are particularly good for those local
economies. 14
The situation in the public sector is more complicated. The
private sector is governed by one body of law-the NLRA15-but
each state has its own public sector labor law. And those laws are
11. Cynthia Estlund & William E. Forbath, Op-ed, The War on Workers,
N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/03/opinion/the-
supreme-court -ruling-on-harris-v-quinn-is -a-blow-for-unions.html; accord
Estreicher, supra note 10, at 31 ("A] right to free ride on union
representation... deprive[sl unions of a justifiable funding mechanism so
that they no longer can play a useful collective-bargaining role in our
society.").
12. See Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union Decline, Economic and
Political Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 1637, 1645 (2014).
13. About NRTWC, NATL RIGHT TO WORK COMM., http://nrtwc.org/about-
2/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2014).
14. See Raymond Hogler & Steven Shulman, The Law, Economics, and
Politics of Right to Work: Colorado's Labor Peace Act and its Implications for
Public Policy, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 933-34 (1999).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
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quite variable. 16 Some states prohibit public employees from
engaging in collective bargaining altogether; some states have
public sector labor laws that look much like the NLRA; and other
states give public sector unions more power than their private
sector counterparts. 17  Some states, most importantly for our
purposes, permit public sector unions to negotiate union-security
clauses. 18 That brings us, almost, to Harris v. Quinn.19
Many have argued that the balance struck by the Court and
Congress with respect to enforcement of union-security clauses in
the private sector should not be transferred to the public sector.
In the public sector, they argue, the First Amendment rights of
objectors are more acute. To force a public school teacher, for
example, to pay for the services of a union that teacher opposes
forces that teacher to support the union's political positions.
Bargaining with a public body-e.g., a school board-the
argument goes, necessarily requires a union to take positions on
public policy, even if that union is simply negotiating for a wage
increase. 20 In short, negotiations with a public body about
resources are inescapably political.
This issue came before the Court in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education.21 Under Michigan law at that time, local
government employees had rights to organize and engage in
collective bargaining, and union-security provisions were
enforceable, under which every employee represented by a union,
even though not a union member, was required to pay a service
fee equal in amount to union dues. 22 A union selected by a
majority of the public school teachers in Detroit negotiated, as
part of a comprehensive collective bargaining agreement with the
16. See, e.g., Vijay Kapoor, Public Sector Labor Relations: Why It Should
Matter to the Public and to Academia, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 401, 409
(2003).
17. See, e.g., Milla Sanes & John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector
Collective Bargaining in the States, CENTER FOR ECON. & POL'Y RESEARCH,
Mar. 2014, at 1, 4-5, available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/state-
public-cb-2014-03.pdff.
18. See Martha H. Good, Comment, The Expansion of Exclusive
Privileges For Public Sector Unions: A Threat to First Amendment Rights?, 53
U. CIN. L. REV. 781, 785 (1984).
19. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
20. See generally id.
21. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
22. Id. at 211.
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Detroit Board of Education, a union-security provision. 23 A group
of teachers thereafter filed suit, alleging that their First
Amendment rights would be violated by enforcement of the
provision-both because they opposed collective bargaining in the
public sector, and because the provision would require them to pay
for union political expenditures unrelated to collective
bargaining. 24
The Court first reviewed existing precedents, which, as
summarized above, permit enforcement of union-security
provisions in the private sector so long as the provisions do not
require objectors to pay for union political activity.25 The Court
described those cases as holding that the objector's First
Amendment interests in withholding any and all financial support
from the union were outweighed by "the legislative assessment of
the important contribution of the union shop to the system of
labor relations established by Congress." 26  Adhering to those
cases, the Court acknowledged, would require validation of the
Michigan scheme so long as the service charges obtained from
objectors were used exclusively "to finance expenditures by the
Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract
administration, and grievance adjustment."27
However, the Court then took the time to consider whether
application of those precedents was appropriate, given the "very
real differences" between private and public sector collective
bargaining. 28 The Court reasoned that the State's interests in the
public benefits of union-security provisions were identical in the
private and public sectors. 29 It also found that private and public
sector objectors had equally important First Amendment rights at
stake when being forced to financially support organizations to
which they objected. 30  Thus, the Court held that the
constitutional balance should be the same in the private and
23. Id. at 211-12.
24. Id. at 212-14.
25. Id. at 217-20 (citing Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961);
Railway Emps.' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956)).
26. Id. at 222.
27. Id. at 225-26.
28. Id. at 230.
29. Id. at 232.
30. Id. at 230-31.
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public sectors. 31 The Court held that Michigan's authorization of
union-security provisions in the public sector did not violate the
First Amendment rights of objectors, except that objectors could
not constitutionally be required to pay for union spending
unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative,
such as spending to support political candidates or express
political views. 32
This is where the law stood when Harris v. Quinn came along.
When the Court granted certiorari33 the case had a relatively low
profile. Harris appeared to present an issue involving a rather
arcane aspect of public sector labor law and Medicaid in-home
personal care providers. On the other hand, as some observers
began to point out, Harris could serve as a vehicle for the Court to
consider whether to overrule Abood.34 At oral argument it became
quite clear that the petitioners were asking the Court to overrule
Abood and prohibit union-security provisions in the public sector
on First Amendment grounds 35-an argument that the Court took
quite seriously. Therefore, by the time the Court issued its
decision, interest in the case had increased dramatically.
The plaintiffs in Harris provided in-home personal care
services in Illinois to individuals who qualified under the federal
Medicaid program.36 Under the program, Illinois, subsidized by
federal Medicaid funds, paid these "personal assistants," but the
assistants were hired and under the control of the individual
Medicaid-eligible patients. 37
Under Illinois law, state employees were authorized to form
unions and engage in collective bargaining. 38 In addition, union-
security provisions in any resulting agreement were enforceable. 39
31. Id. at 232.
32 Id. at 230-37.
33. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618
(2014) (No. 11-681), 2011 WL 6019918.
34 See, e.g., Will Baude, Harris v. Quinn and the Future of Abood,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 1, 2013, 9:51 P.M.), http://www.volokh.com/2013/
10/01 /harris-v-quinn-future-abood/ (referring to Harris as a "sleeper").
35. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Harris, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (No. 11-
681), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument
transcripts/11-681 8mj8.pdf.
36. 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
37. Id. at 2624.
38. Id. at 2625; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 315/6(a), (c) (2008).
39. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625; see also 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 315/6(e).
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When the Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") sought
to organize the personal assistants, the Illinois Labor Relations
Board concluded that the assistants were not employed by the
State and, therefore, were not eligible to organize and engage in
collective bargaining with the State. 40
However, the Illinois legislature amended the law to provide
that the personal assistants were public employees solely for the
purposes of coverage under the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act.41 Thereafter, a majority of the personal assistants voted for
representation by the SEIU, and the union entered into an
agreement with the State of Illinois that contained a union-
security provision. 42 The plaintiffs did not support the union and
claimed that enforcement of the provision would violate their First
Amendment rights.43 Ultimately, the Court concluded, by a
classic 5-4 vote (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito,
Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas in the majority) that the plaintiffs'
claim had merit, but not because union-security provisions were
unenforceable in the public sector. 44
The constitutional infirmity the majority found in the Illinois
scheme was that it required personal assistant objectors to pay for
union representation vis-A-vis the State when, in fact, the
personal assistants were employed by their Medicaid-eligible
patients. 45 This meant that the power of the union to negotiate
with the State was circumscribed-essentially the union was
limited to negotiating with the State over payment rates. 46 The
Court refused to "extend" Abood to a situation where the union
could not offer the personal assistants it represented the benefits
of increased bargaining power with regard to all terms and
conditions of employment. 47  Abood's rationale, the Court
explained, "is based on the assumption that the union possesses
the full scope of powers and duties generally available under
American labor law."48 The personal assistants, by contrast, were
40. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
41. Id. at 2626; see also 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2405/3(f) (2001).
42. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2634-37.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2634-36.
47. Id. at 2637 n.18, 2638.
48. Id. at 2626.
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explicitly deemed by Illinois law to be "public employees solely for
the purpose of unionization and the collection of an agency fee." 49
The Court's narrow rationale for ruling for the personal
assistant objectors; the rather unique labor law regime created in
Illinois for the personal assistants; and the distinctive work
relationship between the personal assistants, the Medicaid-
eligible clients, and the State of Illinois do not, however, make
Harris v. Quinn a non-event. Harris seems to foreshadow the
demise of Abood.
Before explaining its narrow holding, the majority spent
approximately seven pages explaining why Abood should be
overruled. 50 First, explained the Court, Abood was "something of
an anomaly" because free-rider arguments are generally
insufficient to justify interfering with legitimate First Amendment
interests. 51 Second, the Court characterized the private-sector
cases upon which the Abood Court relied in rejecting the broad
constitutional challenge to union-security provisions in the public
sector as "thin," "narrow," and "remarkable."52  It therefore
criticized the Abood Court for relying so heavily on those cases
and ignoring important differences between private and public
sector collective bargaining.53 In the latter instance, explained
the Court, the objectors' First Amendment interests are
heightened because issues such as wages, pensions, and benefits
are important political issues. 54 Moreover, as a consequence, the
line between chargeable and non-chargeable union activities in
the public sector is extraordinarily difficult to demarcate, and it is
the objector's burden to limn the two categories. 55 Finally, the
Court explained that there was no necessary relationship between
a union's ability to effectively negotiate on behalf of all members
of a bargaining unit and the requirement that all those members
financially support the union's activities. 56
When the majority was done with Abood, the 1977 case was
49. Id. at 2627.
50. See id. at 2627-34.
51. Id. at 2627 (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132
S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 2627-30.
53. Id. at 2631-33.
54. Id. at 2631-32.
55. Id. at 2633.
56. Id. at 2640-41.
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bruised and bloodied-all but dead. As Justice Kagan wrote in
her dissent, "[t]oday's majority cannot resist taking potshots at
Abood."57 She commended, but refused to applaud, the majority
for stopping short of overruling Abood.58
I am much less sanguine. The majority opinion in Harris
reads like Abood's obituary, and it seems only a matter of time
before a majority, maybe even this majority, will finish the job.
These are not good times for unions. Private sector union density
is now below seven percent. 59 And unions in the public sector
have become the target of considerable criticism and political
attacks. Some have speculated that Justice Alito, who wrote the
majority in Harris, thought he had five votes to overrule Abood,
which explains the extensive language essentially eviscerating the
decision. 60 Whether or not that is true, there is little left for a
majority to do to conclude that the First Amendment provides for
a right-to-work law in the public sector.
57. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2652-53
("Readers of today's decision will know that Abood does not rank
on the majority's top-ten list of favorite precedents-and that the majority
could not restrain itself from saying (and saying and saying) so.").
58. Id. at 2645.
59. See Dave Jamieson, Union Membership Ticks Up In The Private
Sector, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 12:46 P.M.), http:/www.
huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/24/union-membership-2013 n 4659586.html.
60. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, In attacking unions, the Roberts court
forgets a key lesson of the New Deal, SLATE (June 30, 2014, 3:04 P.M.),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/the breakfast table/features/
2014/scotus roundup/supreme court 2014 harris v quinn forgets the lesso
n of the new deal.html.
